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## The Identity Politics of Muslims in Indonesian Democracy

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### Abstract

Islam exists as the dominant identity in Indonesian democracy but has become a spirit of identity politics that prioritizes religious interests only. Moreover, Islamic political ideals do not find a common point of view or purpose. On the contrary, Muslims argue with each other and spend their energy and attention on differences in views and political movements. Thus, this paper aims to examine discursively and critically the identity politics of Muslims amid Indonesian democratic life. The study found that Indonesian Muslims explore religious values to participate in Indonesian democracy. However, regarding these political ideals, there are differences of views among Muslims which are a source of division among Muslims themselves. The political ideal of Islam is a universal ideal, not only for Muslims but also for the entire universe. The debates of views and movements among Muslims themselves are a setback for Islamic values as well as the identity of Muslims in the dynamics of Indonesian democracy.

**Key Words:** Identity Politics, Islam, Indonesian Democracy

### Abstrak

Islam hadir sebagai identitas dominan dalam demokrasi Indonesia namun menjadi sebuah spirit politik identitas yang mengedepankan kepentingan agama semata. Lebih dari itu cita-cita politik Islam tidak menemukan titik pandangan atau tujuan yang sama. Sebaliknya, umat Islam justru saling berdebat dan menghabiskan energi serta perhatiannya atas perbedaan pandangan maupun gerakan politik. Dengan demikian tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji secara diskursif dan kritis atas politik identitas umat Islam di tengah-tengah kehidupan demokrasi Indonesia. Kajian ini menemukan bahwa umat Islam Indonesia mengeksplorasi nilai-nilai agama untuk turut berpartisipasi dalam demokrasi Indonesia. Namun mengenai cita-cita politik tersebut terdapat pelbagai perbedaan pandangan dari kalangan Islam yang justru menjadi sumber perpecahan dalam umat Islam itu sendiri. Padahal, cita-cita politik Islam adalah cita-cita yang universal, bukan hanya untuk umat Islam semata melainkan juga untuk seluruh semesta. Perdebatan-perdebatan pandangan dan gerakan dalam kalangan umat Islam itu sendiri justru menjadi kemunduran bagi nilai-nilai Islam sekaligus identitas umat Islam dalam dinamika demokrasi Indonesia.

**Kata Kunci :** Politik Identitas, Islam, Demokrasi Indonesia

## Introduction

The political system of the Indonesian state is a popular democracy. It is a democracy that emphasizes the sovereignty of the people and therefore of, by, and for the benefit of the people (Locke, 2003). In reviewing the history of independence, the founding fathers wanted a more specific democracy, namely democracy based on Pancasila commonly called Pancasila Democracy.

Pancasila democracy emphasizes a distinctive democratic way or system based on genealogical-historical reflections and anthropological realities of the Indonesian nation. So the democracy in question is not like liberal democracy in the Western view nor is it democracy run on socialist or communist ideas, nor is democracy run on a particular religious identity or theo-democracy. The hope for an ideal democracy is seen in the discourse of the beginning of the establishment of the Indonesian state. In the notes of the BPUPKI Minutes, Soepomo said that the presence of the Indonesian state must be by the special characteristics of the nature and pattern of Indonesian society and based on an intergalactic school of thought (*staatsidee*) which includes groups in society (Sekretariat Negara, 1980).

Bung Karno also emphasized that the Indonesian state stands on *philosophische grondslag* (the philosophical basis of the state) in the same *weltanschauung* (worldview). That the independence of the Indonesian nation is not only for a few groups but for all. For that spirit, Karno translated Indonesian independence as 'political independence' which became a bridge for the establishment of the *Indonesian Nationale Staat* towards the noble ideals contained in Pancasila (Sekretariat Negara, 1980).

Hatta in '*Demokrasi Kita*' also emphasized that the Indonesian state must be in the form of a republic based on people's sovereignty. The sovereignty of the people in question differs from Rousseau's idea of emphasizing an individualistic pattern. For Hatta, the sovereignty of the people created by Indonesia must be rooted in their association with collectivism. Indonesian democracy must also be in the form of the development of the original democracy, namely democracy that is by the ideals of the Indonesian struggle with the desire to create the implementation of the foundations of humanity and social justice (Hatta, 1966).

Thus, our founding fathers wanted an attitude of nationalism based on close and deep ties with the homeland of Indonesia. Nationalism or love for the nation then becomes a legitimacy in the struggle for independence for togetherness that is born and grows from a sense of fate and suffering from colonial oppression to a common commitment to build and defend the Republic of Indonesia and fill independence with a continuous process for the welfare of the people as a whole.

## The Clash of Identity of Political Ideologies

The emergence of nationalism in the modern sense is a form of reaction against colonialism. Indonesian nationalism, in general, has the aim of strengthening nation-building and character-building by the philosophy of life of the nation and state and wants confrontation over all forms of colonialism. However, nationalism as a product of modernity is closely related to the intersection of politics, technology, and social

transformation. Namely, it has lasted since the independence period along with the process of socio-cultural and economic development which is then considered to present various inequalities and dissatisfaction from various social groups. The mandate of nationalism requires the state to be able to contribute to the realization of a prosperous, dignified, and just society (Rambe, 2019).

The political intersection at the beginning of the independence period was seen from two major camps of political identity that differed from the basic idea of the Indonesian state. First, those who want the Indonesian state not to be associated with religious ideology (Islam), namely secular nationalists. Second, the group that wants the state to be based on religion (Islam), namely the Islamist nationalists (Katimin, 2017).

Furthermore, Luthfie Assyaukanie explained that since the establishment of the BPUPKI committee, Muslim leaders have played an important role. They sat down together to discuss the desired country. During the BPUPKI meetings that lasted two weeks, then presented the two major political factions. These Muslim leaders want a state based on "Islam". After a long debate, the committee finally agreed to accept all Islamic formulas, including the Jakarta Charter. However, the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI), which was formed three months later, revoked all articles containing Islamic formulas (Assyaukanie, 2011).

Bachtiar Effendi explained that in overcoming the ideological polemic, Hatta proposed adjustments to ensure the integrity of the Indonesian national state. Hatta urged the Islamic group represented by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, et al to then agree to remove the legalistic-formalistic elements of Islam. That is to repeal the points about Islam as the official state religion only, the requirement that the president must be Muslim, and the obligation to observe Islamic law for its adherents listed in the Jakarta charter. Instead, the alternative is to include theological-monotheistic elements in the first precept of Pancasila. That is, "The One True Godhead" (Effendi, 2011).

Furthermore, Deliar Noer also explained some of the reasons why Islamic group leaders can immediately accept the abolition of the Jakarta Charter as a *constitutional modus vivendi* where efforts to obtain it must be pursued through tireless struggle in the PPKI (Noer, 1987). These reasons are seen in two ways: *First*, the inclusion of the words "The One and Only One" as a symbolic step to indicate the presence of monotheistic elements of Islam in the ideology of the state. It can be seen in the view of Wahid Hasjim who believes that the addition of a monotheistic nature in Pancasila is at least a reflection of the principle of tawhid in Islam. *Second*, the situation that followed the proclamation of independence required the founding fathers of the republic to unite to face other more crucial problems, namely the presence of the Dutch who tried to reoccupy Indonesia (Effendi, 2011).

Other Islamic leaders were not very willing to accept this formula. Isa Anshary viewed the incident as a fraud perpetrated against Muslims, even saying it was "a political siege to the ideals of Muslims". Bachtiar concludes that such an event marks the first defeat of the Islamic group in its attempt to realize an integral idea between legal and formal in the context of Islam and the State (Effendi, 2011). From there the polemic of identity politics of Muslims continues in the constellation of Islam and the State and fellow Islamic identity itself in a democratic discourse that is concerning to this day.

## Method

This type of research uses literature or qualitative research. Qualitative research is a research procedure to produce descriptive data (Gunawan, 2013). In other words, qualitative research or literature is the description of certain methods used to determine literature studies for scientific reasons such as chronological-historical, certain points of view, comparisons, and so on related to the identity politics of Muslims amid the dynamics of Indonesian democracy.

This research method includes methods of collecting, analyzing, and presenting data. The data collection method is determined using literature research by collecting materials from primary and secondary sources that are considered relevant to writing materials. Quoting Ida Bagoes, the review of relevant literature is intended to: (1) Find concepts that are relevant to the subject matter discussed in the research; (2) Explore theories relevant to research problems and make comparisons; (3) examine the results of past research (works) that are closely related to the subject matter to be discussed; (4) Develop a framework on which all activities are based; (5) Develop conjectures (hypotheses) that can provide a clear direction for data collection and analysis (Mantra, 2016). From this study, a frame of mind can be produced that can be the basis for the author to compile research hypotheses or new paradigms to provide solutions to the problems discussed.

## Theoretical Studies

The author uses theories relevant to the discussion, namely the theory of identity politics. Theoretically, identity politics is a political attitude that prioritizes the interests of a group because it has a similar identity or characteristics, whether based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. Identity politics is nothing but the politics of difference. Identity politics is a political action with efforts to channel aspirations to influence policies and control over the distribution of values that are considered valuable to the most fundamental demand, namely self-determination based on primordiality (Nasrudin, 2018). Cressida Heyes translates identity politics as a signifier of political activity (Heyes, 2007).

According to Agnes Heller, identity politics is a political movement that focuses its attention on differences as one main political category. Identity politics arises from the consciousness of individuals to elaborate particular identities, in the form of relations in primordial ethnic and religious identities. The use of identity politics to gain power, which only hardens differences and encourages dissension, does not mean that it does not draw sharp criticism. Identity politics seems to affirm the existence of an essentialistic wholeness about the existence of certain social groups based on the identification of primordiality (Nasrudin, 2018). Agnes Heller defines identity politics as a political concept and movement that focuses on difference as a primary political category (Abdillah S, 2002).

Therefore, in this discussion, the author tries to identify the reality of Islamic politics by critically examining the side of Islamic political identity which has various patterns of thought and identity politics of Muslims as a movement that is fought amid

Indonesian democratic life.

## Results and Discussion

The author found that there are at least three Islamic identity groups that have ideas and movements of identity politics with different patterns and directions. The first identity is represented by Islamic groups in the early days of independence who wanted Islamic political ideals in the building of an "Islamic democratic state". The second identity is represented by Islamic groups that want Islamic political ideals and a moderate state, agree with the democratic state of Indonesia, but reject the secularization of religion and state. The last identity is represented by liberal Islamic groups who want the secularization of religion and the state within the framework of Indonesian democracy. According to the latter group, Islam does not have to be a state institution to show its Islamic side. To see more clearly, the author will explain the discussion as follows.

### The Idea of an Islamic Democratic State

In a historical review, in line with Assyaukanie's analysis that since the PPKI decision was considered controversial by various Islamic figures, it made a strong reason for efforts to realize the Islamic political model which was considered a noble idea and was considered needed to realize historical truth (Assyaukanie, 2011). M. Natsir was the most important thinker in Islamic political ideals which he called the '*Islamic Democratic State*' (Natsir, 2000) through the Masyumi political party.

Natsir wrote many articles to express his views on political Islam, especially '*Capita Selecta*' (Natsir, 1954b) which was his most important thought. He was chairman of Masyumi (1949-1958) and was also prime minister (1950). Another thinker was Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911-1983) who was also politically affiliated with Masyumi. His influential magnum opus, '*Membentuk Negara Islam*' (Abidin Ahmad, 1956), is a blueprint for the conception of the Islamic Democratic State as the main agenda of political Islam.

Another figure is Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-1989) who became Minister of Finance in Syahrir's third cabinet (1946). His important political role as head of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (1948) and head of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (1958) was considered an act of radical opposition as an alternative government against Sukarno.

Other great Masyumi leaders such as Mohamad Roem (1908-1983), Abu Hanifah (1906-1981), Hamka (1908-1981), and Mohammad Rasjidi (1915-2001) actively participated in the political movement of the Islamic Democratic State. Roem was known as an accomplished diplomat who increased Masyumi's political electability. Abu Hanifa was a religious-socialist figure who liked to write books on politics and religion, and his political work as Minister of Education in the Hatta Cabinet (1949). Hamka is one of Masyumi's main ideologues. Hamka is famous as a writer and scholar. His magnum opus is Tafsir al-Azhar. Rasjidi was once the first Minister of Religious Affairs, as well as a fierce critic of the religious renewal movement in Indonesia (Assyaukanie, 2011).

A small part of this first group comes from the Nahdlatul Ulama group. Namely, Wachid Hasjim (1914-1953), Idham Chalid (1921), Imron Rosjadi (1916), and Mohammad Dahlan (1909-1977). Hasjim was the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (1951-

1954), son of Hasjim Asj'ari, who was also a member of BPUPKI and one of the signatories of the Jakarta Charter and became Minister of Religious Affairs (1949-1950) in the Hatta Cabinet. Chalid was also chairman of NU (1955-1984) and was known as an accomplished politician who held various strategic positions in the Sukarno era. He was also the first chairman of the DPR/MPR (1971-1977) of the Suharto era. Rosjadi took part as the head of the Ansor Youth who disagreed with Sukarno. For opposing Sukarno, he was imprisoned (1962-1966). Dahlan was a member of the Masyumi party's executive council, chairman of NU (1954-1956), and Minister of Religious Affairs in 1967 (Assyaukanie, 2011).

However, if we look further into the Islamic political ideas initiated by this Islamic group when discussing democracy and Islam the concept of an Islamic state is something overlapping. Syaukanie calls it an effort to "Islamize" the state through Masyumi (Assyaukanie, 2011). Especially radically seen in the political efforts of the Darul Islam movement (1948) which wants an Islamic state through its armed organizations.

Natsir and Ahmad argue that the term progressive Islamic state is an Islamic identity inspired by Pakistan. Natsir is of the view that rejection of the term is a Western Islamophobic stance. While among them also disagree, as Prawiranegara and Roem argue that the term "Islamic state" is something counterproductive, so as not to be used (Madjid & Roem, 2000). But all agree that a country like Saudi Arabia is not the ideal type of Islamic state that can be applied in Indonesian democracy.

They presented democracy in a proposed Islamic state with two main principles as its basis, namely that the Islamic state is not a theocracy and strongly opposed the secular state. The first refers to no unification of religion and state under a religious elite. The second means there is no separation of religion and state under secular rule. They consider the concept of religious neutrality as a form of absence of state responsibility and function over religion. Religious neutrality in democracy is seen as an attempt to justify religious marginalization. So, according to this group, a Muslim must ensure that the state is neither secular nor requires religious neutrality.

The presence of communists in national politics puts the ideas and movements of identity politics that carry the Islamic state in a difficult position. The political strategy that this group then carried out was to immediately accept Pancasila as the basis of the state, and even praise Pancasila (Natsir, 1954a). However, when they saw communism taking shelter and taking refuge under Pancasila, they immediately turned to antipathy towards the dangers of Pancasila. Natsir considered that Pancasila was incompatible with the teachings of the Quran, Pancasila was considered secular with Islamic teachings (Natsir, 2001). Both Pancasila and communism became the main enemies in the agenda of Islamic political ideals.

This Islamist group prefers democracy, not a theocracy. In their political practice, they commit to liberal democracy. Masyumi then stood as a progressive party dedicated to modern democratic values. Herbert Feith (1962) described Masyumi as more progressive than other nationalist parties in supporting liberal democracy. Masyumi considers that support for democracy is a necessity because Islamic teachings require it (Feith, 1962).



However, the presence of Sukarno's guided democracy made this group condemn an attitude of political opposition to the state. On 28 October 1956, Sukarno dissolved the political parties. He believes that political parties exacerbate conflicts and undermine the stability of the country. In fact, according to this Islamic group, democracy is a fundamental pillar of democracy. That's why they criticized Sukarno's leadership. For the same reason, this Islamist group criticized the communists. Communism is a real danger to democracy because it has the ultimate political goal of creating a monolithic society within the communist party (Mahendra, 1999). The Islamists agreed that Indonesia under Guided Democracy was a cunning combination of Sukarno's dictatorship and communist totalitarianism.

Under the pretext of saving democracy, some of them carried out radical steps through the alternative government of PRRI on February 15, 1958. Prawiranegara, Natsir, and Burhanuddin were the three central figures in the radical opposition against Sukarno. However, according to the three figures, (Rosidi, 1990) the existence of PRRI is not intended to establish a separate state, but political reactions and efforts to return to the Constitution and healthy democratic principles.

By and large, these Islamists did not feel there was a problem with liberal democracy, which had been implemented during the first 15 years of independence. This can be seen with the position of Mohammad Natsir, Sukiman, and Burhanuddin Harahap who all three became prime ministers during Sukarno's time with good performance. Herbert Feith considered Natsir's government one of the best-performing cabinets during the period of constitutional democracy (Feith, 1962).

However, this has not been able to explain some of the narrow views and attitudes of Islamic groups towards certain political and religious issues, such as minority rights, freedom of religion, and freedom of thought. In line with Syaukanie, this problem is closely related to the "limitations of Islamic democracy" in the Indonesian democratic stage. This is related to the problem of attitudes towards understanding classical Islamic texts which contribute to the limitations of his democratic outlook. The first is the issue of God's sovereignty, and the second is the rights of non-Muslims, as well as the issue of women's rights (Assyaukanie, 2011).

### **Islamic Political Reform Efforts**

The views of the first Islamic group are considered incompatible with a democratic country that wants equality for all Indonesian citizens. The idea of an Islamic democratic state is only possible for the majority of Muslims who have a uniform understanding of Islam and the magnanimity of a minority who are willing to live in such a democracy. Later generations of Muslims, then, sought to build a more dominant Islamic political identity, agreeing on the urgency of equality as a principle of political pluralism. However, the two Islamic groups differ in views on the relationship between state and religion. The first group wants the important role of the state in determining the religiosity of the people. While the second group proposed that the state be neutral so that dynamically both moved in different directions, but dominant in the Suharto era were direct or indirect supporters of the New Order development project.

During his reign, Suharto was aware of the ideologically fragmented elements of

nationality. This required Suharto to present a strategic national consolidation agenda (Elson, 2001). Soeharto managed to keep the military factions in one command and subordinate the political parties under his control. Previous political ideologies, such as Nationalism, Islamism, and Communism were not allowed to develop in the Suharto era. He then created a national identity in the ideology of Pancasila to play an active role in gluing the frame of different Indonesian societies. Pancasila was then confirmed as a state identity that Suharto believed could make the country of Indonesia 'religious' because it contained the aspirations of the people's religiosity (Assyaukanie, 2011).

The irony for this second group of Muslims is their political activities under the Suharto regime. This can be seen in the context of the political reality of Muslims which is inseparable from the pragmatic politics created by Suharto. Under the influence of such socio-political circumstances, the Muslim generation in the early 1970s marked the transition of the old Islamic political order to a new direction, namely the awareness of a multi-religious society. This second Islamic group seeks to realize Islamic political ideals more openly towards modernization, development, and democratization. We can notice that this second group of Islamic political movements is closely related to Suharto.

This was seen when Muslim figures of this group were willing to cooperate with the state, either as an ally of Suharto or as his political opposition. Among those who became Suharto's allies were MS Mintaredja as Minister of Social Affairs and Abdul Mukti Ali as Minister of Religious Affairs who carried out various interfaith dialogue projects. On the other hand, Lukman Harun and Djarnawi Hadikusumo were in opposition. Lukman and Djarnawi as the first chairman and secretary-general of Parmusi. Parmusi is an Islamic party initiated to replace Masyumi. However, since its inception, Parmusi was unable to escape Suharto's hegemony. When Parmusi held its first congress with the election of M. Roem, Suharto immediately refused to recognize it and instead appointed Mintaredja as the leader of Parmusi (Assyaukanie, 2011).

This Islamic political identity is much liked by Muhammadiyah leaders. Amien Rais and Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif are two leaders of Muhammadiyah (1995-2005) who can be considered as Islamic political thinkers of this group. Other Muhammadiyah figures, Kuntowijoyo and Dawam Rahardjo are also among the supporters of this Islamic political identity, emphasizing the importance of a religious base for democracy. Two of Kuntowijoyo's books, namely '*Paradigma Islam: Interpretasi untuk Aksi*' (Kuntowijoyo, 1993) and '*Identitas Politik Umat Islam*' (Kuntowijoyo, 1997) is an important reference for analyzing his religious-political mode of thought.

During the Suharto era, these intellectuals indirectly affirmed the truth of Pancasila as an ideal model for Indonesian Muslims. On the contrary, the idea of changing Pancasila as the basis of the state is considered no longer relevant because it is better to focus on development and political stability than the ideological feuds that have passed. Simply put, this Muslim group can be seen from its perspective and political movement that accepts Pancasila and rejects the idea of secularism (separation of religion and state). According to him, secularism is the real enemy of Islam.

Muslims are politically divided into various groups, and this diversity cannot be accommodated by exclusive political ideals such as earlier Islamic political movements. The 1955 elections were concrete proof that Muslims did not want such a model, as



Islamic parties received less than half of the vote. While this second Islamic group is a kind of revision of the old model that has failed. Nevertheless, the revision seems half-hearted, because some of the foundations that characterized the first Islamic groups – such as the rejection of secularism – are still widely defended and supported. In the socio-political aspect, dependence on the state fuels tensions between Islam and other religious communities because Muslims only feel that they have the right to use state authority to realize their demands, especially in legal form. Thus comes the paradox of group identity politics. Opposition to political secularism is not fully supported by non-Muslim minorities. They prefer the principle of political secularism, which is considered more neutral concerning the issue of religion-state relations in Indonesia (Assyaukanie, 2011).

### **Renewal of Democracy and Liberal Muslim Identity**

The Islamic political movement by the second group received a response from liberal Muslim thinkers, especially to the problem of religious and state relations which were considered to nourish state hegemony over people's religious activities. Liberal thinkers agree that the condition of the pluralistic Indonesian nation requires us to create national integration in line with the principles of pluralism, especially the separation of the roles of religion and state. Liberal Islamic thinkers believe that the state is not good at interfering in people's private affairs, including religious affairs.

The fall of Suharto has led to a more liberal political atmosphere in which freedom of expression and freedom of speech prevail in Indonesian democracy. As far as Muslim santri, it dates to the early 1970s when the Islamic renewal movement emerged and dramatically changed Muslim political discourse in the country. There are Muslim reformers who have more liberal religious-political attitudes than others. Nurcholish Madjid and Djohan Effendi, for example, were among the Muslim reformers who consistently promoted Islamic liberalism and staunchly supported the idea of Liberal Democracy. Although the main concerns of the two reformers were not political, some of their views directly or indirectly influenced the discourse of Islamic political thought in the country (Assyaukanie, 2011).

Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) called Cak Nur is known as an Islamic modernist figure whose main agenda is to update the understanding of Islam. While a student, he was elected chairman of HMI for two period (1966-1971). After obtaining his Pp.D. (1984) in Canada and returned to Indonesia to continue the religious renewal project by establishing Paramadina as a pluralistic institution for exchanging ideas (Assyaukanie, 2011). Nurcholish published many books, mostly on general issues of Islam as well as Islamic political thought.

Cak Nur developed the idea of secularization from modern sociological discourse on religion. Cak Nur borrowed the term secularization from Talcott Parsons and Robert N. Bellah who were well-known sociologists. In Parsons' view, secularization as a sociological concept implies the independence of mankind from mythological views. This does not in itself mean the loss of their religious faith (Parsons, 1961). On the contrary, the liberation process was heavily inspired by religious beliefs. Bellah (1970) argues that the process of liberation of mythology in Islam is mainly due to the Islamic concept of tawhid. Mythology is the part of the "god" that must be destroyed (Bellah,

1970). Therefore, Cak Nur stated that "*secularization is a consequence of tawhid*." (Nurcholish, 1987) (Budhy, 2020).

Through social analysis, Cak Nur entered his idea of Islamic renewal into a political context. Secularization in a political context thus serves to distinguish exactly what is essentially religious and what is not. Cak Nur's secularization agenda targets Indonesian Muslims to realize that Islam in Indonesia has developed and changed with the times, where Islamic political parties are no longer relevant. Whether or not there is an Islamic party, Islam will continue to grow and Indonesian Muslims will become more Islamic. What Cak Nur wants to say is that Muslims must recognize that the struggle to establish Islam is not in itself the exclusive right of an Islamic political party (Assyaukanie, 2011).

Like Cak Nur, Djohan Effendi also paid attention to religious renewal in Indonesia. When he was a student, together with M. Dawam Rahardjo and Ahmad Wahib, Djohan founded a discussion group called "*Limited Group*" which was later listed as a seedbed for the Islamic reform movement in Indonesia (Hassan, 1980). After graduating, Djohan worked at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and held various positions, including head of Research and Development (1998-2000). During Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency, he was appointed Secretary of State (2000–2001). In 2001, together with several Muslim leaders, he founded ICRP, an institution focused on religious dialogue and pluralism.

Abdurrahman Wahid also emerged through his liberal views on religious-political issues. In Jakarta, Wahid is active in various organizations. Wahid's political career began when he was elected chairman of NU (1984). He launched a critique of the regime at the time and advocated minority rights. His political career reached its peak in 1999 when he succeeded Habibie as president. The three intellectuals referred to Greg Barton (1995) as Muslim liberal leaders (Barton, 1955) who had a central role in spreading liberal views among Indonesian Muslims. Cak Nur and Djohan Effendi had a major influence on the younger generation of modernist Muslims, while Wahid's influence was enormous among traditionalist Muslims (NU) (Djohan, 2000).

Besides Cak Nur, other figures are Abdul Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution. During his tenure as Minister of Religious Affairs, Ali sent delegations of IAIN students to continue their studies at Western universities, especially McGill University, Canada. Later, this exchange project left a great impact on the development of Islamic intellectualism in IAIN. Mukti Ali encouraged many religious dialogue forums in Indonesia, which he said aimed to foster interfaith tolerance. (Munhanif, 1996) Meanwhile, the role of Harun Nasution (1979) is important in introducing and consistently using a rational approach to the study of religion (Muzani, 1994). Harun is often considered a controversial figure because his ideas about "rational Islam" were inspired by the thoughts of the Mu'tazila. Like other Muslim reformers, Harun supported the government's development and modernization agenda and believed that only through modernization would Muslim conditions improve.

Based on the belief that secularization or separation of religion and state is possible in Islam, liberals believe that a state governed without religious interference is better than a state that is intervened by religion. The state is a public institution that is the

"property" of every citizen. Therefore, he must be neutral (Assyaukanie, 2011). Historically, Liberal Islamic identity is not new to Indonesian political discourse. It dates to the early days of independence, when "secular" groups rejected the idea of an Islamic state. For almost 30 years this liberal Muslim identity was widespread only among "secular" and non-Muslims. Meanwhile, Muslim students are generally more accepting of the idea of a state based on religion – both Islam and religion in general – represented by the first and second groups. However, since the 1970s and then on the rise in the late 1990s, it has been built on the principle of liberal democracy, in which the state is positioned as an independent political institution. It is not dominated by religion, nor does it dominate religion (Assyaukanie, 2011).

### **Discourse on the Transformation of Political Islam**

Since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesian democracy seems to be a breath of fresh air and reaps many hopes for better changes to come. Indonesian democracy is then vibrant with the freedom of citizens to express their political opinions, establish political parties, and openly and correctively criticize the government, especially with a breath of fresh air for press and media freedom in the new face of Indonesian democracy. The media then plays an important role in disseminating information, not only reporting political changes and reform agendas but also socio-cultural and religious-political issues of society.

In addition to press freedom, various political associations in the formation of mass organizations and political parties are very popular. Various groups, from conservatives and Puritans to liberals and secularists were present to color the freedom of association that was previously silenced by the Suharto regime. Past ideas seem to be revived, such as the will to revive the Jakarta Charter, even the Khilafah as proposed by HTI openly strives to establish a pan-Islamic state.

Not wanting to be left behind, the left wing also felt the wind of reform freedom. Such as the presence of the People's Democratic Party, the National Labor Party, the Workers' Solidarity Party, and the All-Indonesian Workers' Solidarity Party, all of which firmly declare themselves as left-wing. Reforms seem to mark the freedom of democratic life.

Meanwhile, the development of political Islam is present in open and critical spaces through various discussion forums, study circles, organizations, and various intellectual circles that appear openly and freely channeling their political thoughts in various mass media, especially newspapers and magazines that were not felt freely during the Soeharto regime. Although Suharto also contributed significantly and closely to the Muslim generation of the 1960s through the empowerment of Islamic education and intellect in modernizing Islamic Education from elementary to tertiary level.

Post-Suharto Islamic political discourse provided freedom that allowed many people to express their ideas in religious, national, and state life. It's just that Muslims then focused not only on earlier ideological issues such as the basic issue of the state, but a much more complex mode of thought. Like whether women can become president or not, and this was triggered by gender-based identity politics campaigns like what Megawati did at that time.

Various patterns of the political identity of Muslims that the author has stated above, especially those who inherited the political thought of the first Islamic group through the ideals of the Islamic state are urged to explain various arguments and rationalizations about the status of women, sharia, hijab, tolerance, rights of non-Muslims, and so on. Those who inherited this political thought such as A.M. Saefuddin and Hamzah Haz who were leaders of the Islamic party (PPP) viewed that Islam forbade women to become political leaders.

The dynamics of contemporary Islamic political thought in Indonesia no longer discuss centrally the debate on the issue of an Islamic state that is considered obsolete, because predominantly the Indonesian Islamic community does not support it. The Islamic state is not in harmony with the spirit of the infinite times. In fact, discourses related to democracy, pluralism, secularism, civil society, freedom, and human rights are rapidly growing discussions. Reformasi revives all elements of the class to have equal opportunities and rights in Indonesia's democratic participation, whether Islamic, liberal, moderate, radical, or whatever it is urged to convince the public to prove the extent to which their arguments are tested for truth and values in real life.

If we look back at the previous discussion, the first Islamic group to want Islamic political ideals in an Islamic state building has lost its bargaining power. This has been met with intense criticism from both the second and third Islamic groups. The idea of an Islamic state is no longer popular, but there are still several Islamic circles who inherit it today. One of them is the presence of the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (LDDI) which develops the spirit and political ideals of Masyumi that have long been dead. The Islamic parties that came after the reform and wanted the return of the Jakarta Charter were none other than still carrying the spirit and reviving the new style of Masyumi. Even though history has proven in the 1999 election, it lost badly. Only the PPP was considered to get a presentation of approximately 10% in Indonesian political contestation at that time. This indicates that the defeat of Islamic parties to demand the return of the Jakarta charter is no longer relevant. The peak was seen during the MPR Annual Session in 2002 when Islamic parties that wanted the Jakarta charter to no longer be intact jointly supported it. Only the PPP and the UN supported the proposal. The rest, both Muhammadiyah and NU, categorically reject the re-enactment of the Jakarta Charter. This is far more embarrassing than what happened during the constitutional debate from 1957 to 1959 when all Islamic parties and Islamic organizations supported the proposal to return the Jakarta Charter to the 1945 Constitution.

The second Islamic group that has Islamic political ideals in a harmonious relationship between religion and state and rejects secularism of religion and state is seen to be represented by the Partai Amanat Nasional. PAN, which at that time was chaired by Amien Rais, wanted to be an open and moderate party that was expected to accommodate religious values in the context of the Indonesian state. This moderate commitment was seen when the MPR Annual Session in 2002 did not support the Islamic faction or the secular faction. This Islamic group also firmly opposes the idea of an Islamic party, because it is considered too narrow and exclusive to interpret Islam. They reject the formalization of Islam in the state, just as there is a formalization of Islamic law (sharia) imposed by the state. The thinkers of this group are not only active in

political parties but also in intellectual movements such as Kuntowijoyo and Syafi'i Maarif. Both Kuntowijoyo and Ma'arif considered that politics is better run rationally, because political dynamics always change with the times, and something that changes is considered contrary to religious nature. Therefore, Amin thinks that politics is about seeking benefits for as many people as possible and therefore must be founded on a spirit of openness and inclusivity (Assyaukanie, 2011).

However, when we look more closely at the reality of political parties such as PAN, which claim to be pluralist, it becomes religious and more intensively accommodates the interests and aspirations of Muslims than any other element than Islam. In fact, Islamic parties such as PKS which used to tend to be Islamist-exclusive such as Masyumi then turned into moderate and modernist in Indonesian politics. Even though the spirit of Islam remains strong and inherent in the PKS party itself.

Liberal Islamic groups in their development influenced many ideas of Indonesian democracy, especially the views of liberal Muslim figures such as Cak Nur, Djohan Effendi, and Gus Dur with fresh ideas regarding Islamic renewal, secularism, inclusive and pluralist views on religious and political issues of Indonesian society. Cak Nur, for example, was an important figure in hastening the fall of Suharto. Even though Cak Nur was blasphemed by many people for accepting his candidacy for president from PKS, the party he had criticized in the past. However, in the end, Cak Nur rejected the political offer.

The views of liberal Muslim groups are further inherited by various agendas and movements of Islamic renewal in Indonesia, both in groups and organizations. Such as the presence of LKis in Yogyakarta, Resist in Malang, JIL in Jakarta, and others who play an important role in the ideas of liberalism in Islamic political thought in Indonesia. If we simplify, these ideas of liberal Islamic identity call for liberal democratic order and secularism, religious pluralism, and freedom and independence for civil society. Liberal Muslims with universal political ideals have a better chance of modern ideas. The younger generation of this group generally pays attention to practical ideas such as human rights, freedom of thought, gender issues, religious pluralism, and so on.

## Conclusion

Based on the author's review through the discussion above, the author tries to elaborate a critical study of the identity politics of Muslims amid Indonesian democratic life. First, there is a need for an understanding that distinguishes firmly between political identity and identity politics. Second, there is a need for a transformation of Islamic political ideas that are universally accepted and accepted by most Muslims in Indonesia. Third, it urges an intellectual political movement that must (immediately) be present to provide rejuvenation or refreshment in the understanding of Islam in general, as well as politically-religiously.

First, regarding the stark distinction between political identity and Muslim identity politics. The author argues that Islamic political identity is a sublime ideal that is as universal as the prophetic mission itself. Islamic political identity requires a broader, heterogeneous society, and touches the joints of national and state life. Islam wants an atmosphere that "*rahmatan lil 'ālamīn*" therefore it is this identity that Muslims should



put forward, not Identity politics. Identity politics requires prioritizing the group and its members with an egoistic, rather than pluralistic spirit when in fact it is exclusivity. The author categorically rejects the idea of the first Muslim group that wants an Islamic state or something similar that seeks to Islamize the state.

Second, there is a transformation of Islamic political ideas that apply universally. The author considers that Muslims must now rethink from an understanding that articulates Islam in a narrow and particular view towards a Universal Islam. It does not have to label Islam to show the Islamic side. Therefore, in this case, the author agrees with the Muslim group Liberals who want a separation of boundaries between religious and state affairs. The state must not interfere too far in the religious and private affairs of citizens. On the contrary, religion in this case Islam should not be naïve to label Islam in every activity of the person, nation, or state. In fact, we must remember, that the Qur'an is not only intended as the holy book of Muslims, but "*Hudan li An-nās*" that is, a guide for all mankind.

Third, there is a need for an intellectual political movement of young people who appear and are skilled to refresh Islamic discourse in more relevant discourse. In this case, the author sees that young Muslims, both of whom have been forged from various Islamic student organizations, such as HMI, PMII, IMM, and others seem to show intellectual lethargy, on the contrary, tend to predominantly engage in free politics without values. Free politics in the sense of politics without attitudes, opportunistic politics, pragmatic, and other sad things that are in the shackles of the seniors of political economy. Islamic youth even tend to inherit past ideas both in the three identities of thought and politics that have been previously described and superficial thoughts that only agree with past Islamic thoughts. In fact, the times are constantly evolving. Thus, experience also develops. The law of evolution of ideas states that only adaptive and relevant thinking can survive with the times. Muslim youth must take a real part in maintaining the continuity of critical intellectual traditions and building strategic movements to ground Islamic values universally and humanistically in democratic life in Indonesia.

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